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Abstract
Increasing accuracy motivation (e.g., by providing monetary incentives for accuracy) often fails to
increase adjustment away from provided anchors, a result that has led researchers to conclude that
people do not effortfully adjust away from such anchors. We challenge this conclusion. First, we show
that people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided anchors and that this
uncertainty often causes people to believe that they have initially adjusted too far away from such
anchors (Studies 1a and 1b). Then, we show that although accuracy motivation fails to increase the gap
between anchors and final estimates when people are uncertain about the direction of adjustment,
accuracy motivation does increase anchor–estimate gaps when people are certain about the direction of
adjustment, and that this is true regardless of whether the anchors are provided or self-generated
(Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). These results suggest that people do effortfully adjust away from provided
anchors but that uncertainty about the direction of adjustment makes that adjustment harder to detect
than previously assumed. This conclusion has important theoretical implications, suggesting that
currently emphasized distinctions between anchor types (self-generated vs. provided) are not
fundamental and that ostensibly competing theories of anchoring (selective accessibility and anchoringand-adjustment) are complementary.
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Abstract
Increasing accuracy motivation (e.g., by providing monetary incentives for accuracy) often fails
to increase adjustment away from provided anchors, a result that has led researchers to conclude
that people do not effortfully adjust away from such anchors. We challenge this conclusion.
First, we show that people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided
anchors, and that this uncertainty often causes people to believe that they have initially adjusted
too far away from such anchors (Studies 1a and 1b). Then, we show that although accuracy
motivation fails to increase the gap between anchors and final estimates when people are
uncertain about the direction of adjustment, accuracy motivation does increase anchor-estimate
gaps when people are certain about the direction of adjustment, and that this is true regardless of
whether the anchors are provided or self-generated (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). These results
suggest that people do effortfully adjust away from provided anchors, but that uncertainty about
the direction of adjustment makes that adjustment harder to detect than previously assumed. This
conclusion has important theoretical implications, suggesting that currently emphasized
distinctions between anchor types (self-generated vs. provided) are not fundamental, and that
ostensibly competing theories of anchoring (selective accessibility and anchoring-andadjustment) are complementary.

Do People Adjust From Provided Anchors? 3
The Effect of Accuracy Motivation on Anchoring and Adjustment:
Do People Adjust from Provided Anchors?
Considering irrelevant values can influence people’s estimates of unknown quantities. This
fact is known as anchoring and it is arguably one of the most important truths about human
judgment (e.g., Gilbert, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2004, 2006; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring was most famously demonstrated by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), who found that people estimated a greater percentage of African countries in
the United Nations after considering a randomly generated “anchor” of 65% than after
considering an anchor of 10%. Researchers have since shown that anchoring arises not only for
such general knowledge questions, but also for arguably more consequential judgments, such as
buying and selling prices (Carlson, 1990; Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman, & McFadden, 1998;
Simonson & Drolet, 2004), purchase quantity decisions (Wansink, Kent, & Hoch, 1998), credit
card repayments (Stewart, 2009), negotiation outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001),
appraisals of real estate (Northcraft & Neale, 1987), personal injury verdicts (Chapman &
Bornstein, 1996), and criminal sentences by legal experts (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006).
Much research has investigated how anchors affect judgment. This research has produced
different theories of anchoring and a debate about which theory is correct. This debate has
seemingly been resolved by distinguishing two types of anchors: anchors that are provided by an
external source (the usual case in numerical anchoring experiments) and anchors that are selfgenerated (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006). Researchers now accept that these
different anchor types induce different psychological processes, and that distinct theories are
needed to explain how self-generated and provided anchors affect judgment (Epley & Gilovich,
2006). Our goal is to argue that this distinction is unnecessary, that provided and self-generated
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anchors affect judgment through largely similar processes, and that people do effortfully adjust
from both provided and self-generated anchors. We accomplish this by investigating the effect of
accuracy motivation on anchoring, an effect on which major theoretical distinctions hinge.
Theories of Anchoring
Anchoring-and-Adjustment Theory
Anchoring-and-adjustment is the traditional explanation of how anchors affect judgment.
According to this theory, the process of generating estimates after considering anchor values
proceeds in multiple stages (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2006; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, &
Gilovich, 2004; Quattrone, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Consider the typical anchoring
study, in which people estimate some quantity (e.g., the length of the Mississippi River) after
first assessing whether the quantity is greater or less than a provided anchor value (e.g., 1200
miles). According to anchoring-and-adjustment theory, estimate generation works as follows (see
Figure 1a). First, people decide whether the correct value is greater or less than the anchor. Then,
they adjust from the anchor by generating an initial value. Next, people test whether this value
seems reasonable or whether they should adjust their estimate again. People who consider their
initial estimate to be “good enough” will cease adjustment and deliver that estimate. In contrast,
people who consider their initial estimate to require modification will adjust their estimate
further away from the anchor value. People repeat the process of testing and adjusting until they
are ultimately satisfied with their estimate. Anchoring effects are thought to arise partly because
people are often not motivated to extensively revise their estimates, and partly because most
people consider a wide range of values to be plausible estimates. Adjustments thus tend to be
insufficient, with people settling on a plausible value that is relatively close to the anchor (Epley
& Gilovich, 2006).
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An important prediction of anchoring-and-adjustment theory concerns the effect of
motivation on adjustment. Relative to unmotivated people, people who are motivated to be
accurate (e.g., because they have a monetary incentive to give correct answers) should have
higher standards, should be less likely to think that their estimates are “good enough,” and
should therefore be more likely to adjust extensively. Thus, motivated individuals’ final
estimates should be further away from anchor values, and motivation should decrease anchoring
effects. However, this prediction has been contradicted by decades of research showing that
increased accuracy motivation fails to reduce anchoring in the typical paradigm (Chapman &
Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; but see Wright &
Anderson, 1989, for a marginally significant exception). Indeed, in their review of the anchoring
literature, Chapman and Johnson (2002) concluded that “incentives reduce anchoring very little
if at all” (p. 125). Because of this null effect of motivation, many researchers have rejected
anchoring-and-adjustment theory and concluded that people do not effortfully adjust from
provided anchors (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2005, 2006; Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997).
Selective Accessibility Model
While researchers were souring on anchoring-and-adjustment theory, Strack and Mussweiler
(1997) proposed a different explanation of anchoring. According to their selective accessibility
model, anchors prompt people to test the hypothesis that the true value is equal to the anchor
value. Because testing hypotheses increases the accessibility of hypothesis-consistent
information (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Wason, 1960), testing whether the true value is equal to
the anchor should increase the accessibility of anchor-consistent information. The selective
accessibility model posits that people use this accessible anchor-consistent information when
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generating their estimates, and that this produces anchoring effects. Thus, merely considering an
anchor of 1200 miles brings to mind information suggesting that the Mississippi River’s length
may be near that value; use of such anchor-consistent accessible information – rather than a
process of (insufficient) adjustment – is thought to lead people to generate an estimate that is
close to the anchor.
This account draws power from its ability to make unique predictions, many of which have
empirical support (Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley, 2004; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000;
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). Most important for this article, and in contrast to anchoring-andadjustment theory, the selective accessibility model posits no adjustment process, and is
therefore not undermined by the null effects of motivation on anchoring reported in the literature.
Thus, there seems to be good reason for favoring the selective accessibility model and for
disfavoring anchoring-and-adjustment theory as an explanation of how anchors affect judgment.
Self-Generated vs. Provided Anchors
Although anchoring-and-adjustment theory has earned disfavor as a description of traditional
anchoring effects, it has made a comeback as an explanation of anchoring effects in a different
paradigm. In an important line of research, Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006) have
suggested that although the selective accessibility model persuasively describes how anchors
affect judgment when the anchors are provided by the experimenter, anchoring-and-adjustment
theory describes how anchors affect judgment when the anchors are self-generated. To illustrate
the self-generated type, consider a participant who is asked to estimate the year that George
Washington became President of the United States. Although the participant may not know the
true answer to this question, she may think of an anchor she knows to be lower or higher (e.g.,
“The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, so it must be after that”), and then adjust
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in what she believes to be the correct direction (e.g., 1777, 1779, and so on). In this case, the
anchor (1776) is self-generated and Epley and Gilovich argue that people adjust from such
anchors.
In support of this claim, Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006) have presented
evidence suggesting that self-generated and provided anchors operate differently. Most critically,
increasing accuracy motivation increases adjustment away from self-generated but not provided
anchors, seemingly implicating effortful adjustment as a process underlying self-generated, but
not provided, anchoring effects (Epley & Gilovich, 2005). On the basis of this differential effect
of motivation, Epley and Gilovich (2006, p. 316) have concluded that it is “clear that not all
anchoring effects result from the same psychological mechanism” and that “anchoring effects
observed in the standard anchoring paradigm . . . are the result of an enhanced accessibility of
anchor-consistent information, not insufficient adjustment.” That is, although anchoring-andadjustment theory seems to best explain how self-generated anchors affect judgment, the
selective accessibility model may best explain how provided anchors affect judgment (see Figure
2a). This conclusion is now widely accepted (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley, 2004;
Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Simonson & Drolet, 2004).
A Revised Theory of Anchoring and Adjustment
As this review makes clear, anchoring theorizing currently hinges on the null effect of
motivation on adjustment from provided anchors, as researchers assume that this result indicates
that provided anchors do not induce adjustment processes.
In contrast, we suggest that people effortfully adjust from all anchors, regardless of whether
they are externally provided or self-generated. We suggest that confusion on this point has arisen
because of three misconceptions in the literature. First, most anchoring theorists treat selective
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accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment as competing explanations of anchoring, therefore
assuming that evidence favoring selective accessibility constitutes evidence against anchoringand-adjustment (and vice versa). However, selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjustment
are not logically contradictory theories: Showing that people selectively recruit anchor-consistent
information does not rule out the possibility that people also effortfully adjust from anchor
values. Thus, the fact that data support the selective accessibility model’s account of anchoring
when anchors are provided does not, in and of itself, mean that people fail to effortfully adjust
from provided anchors. Rather, on purely logical grounds, both selective accessibility and
adjustment could contribute to any given anchoring effect (see Figure 2b).
Second, although anchoring-and-adjustment theory currently assumes that people who are
motivated to correct their initial estimates will always adjust by generating estimates that are
further away from the anchor (Figure 1a; Epley & Gilovich, 2006), we suggest that corrections
of initial estimates may – and do – occur in both directions. Although people who believe that
their initial estimates are too close to the anchor will indeed correct their estimates by adjusting
even further away from the anchor, people may sometimes believe that their initial estimates are
too far from the anchor, and they will correct their estimates by adjusting toward the anchor
when motivated to be accurate (cf. Wegener & Petty, 1995).
Third, as a consequence, increased motivation should not uniformly increase adjustment
away from anchors. Rather, it should only increase the distance between anchors and final
estimates (hereafter referred to as anchor-estimate gaps) when people believe that their initial
estimates are too close to the anchor (i.e., when people believe that their initial adjustments were
insufficient). When people instead believe that their initial estimates are too far from the anchor
(i.e., when people believe that their initial adjustments were too extreme), then increased
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motivation should produce final estimates that are closer to anchors. By this account, anchoringand-adjustment need not – and should not – predict that increasing accuracy motivation will
always increase anchor-estimate gaps (and decrease anchoring effects). Instead, anchoring-andadjustment theory must predict that the effect of motivation depends on people’s beliefs about
whether they initially over- or under-adjusted.
To test this revised view of adjustment, we must first consider what determines whether
people believe that they have adjusted insufficiently (versus too far) from anchors. We suggest
that one important determinant of this belief is whether people are certain about in which
direction to adjust from the anchors in the first place. In particular, we suggest that people will be
more likely to believe that they have adjusted insufficiently from an anchor when they are certain
about the correct direction of adjustment than when they are uncertain.
To understand the motivation for this prediction, imagine trying to estimate the average
number of hairs on a buffalo after encountering an anchor of 500,000. Knowing virtually nothing
about the topic (except that buffaloes are hairy creatures), you might venture an uncertain guess
that the average number is greater than 500,000, and so you might estimate 520,000. Imagine
that you then learn that you will be paid based on how close your estimate is to the correct
answer, and that you can revise your estimate to be more accurate. Although current anchoringand-adjustment theory expects you to adjust even further away from the anchor now that you are
motivated to be accurate, this expectation assumes that you believe that you adjusted
insufficiently (i.e., that you believe that 520,000 is below the true value). However, given how
much uncertainty you had about the correct direction in which to adjust in the first place, you
may instead worry that you adjusted too far, or in the wrong direction altogether. Thus, in the
face of a newfound motivation to be accurate, you may decide to stick with your original
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estimate, or you may actually adjust your estimate toward the anchor rather than further away
from it (see Figure 1b).
Thus, when people are unsure if their initial adjustments are in the correct direction, we
expect them to often believe that they have initially adjusted sufficiently or too far, and to be
unlikely to adjust their estimates further away from the anchor when motivated to be accurate. In
contrast, when people are certain about which direction to adjust from anchor values (e.g., when
they are asked to estimate whether the average number of hairs on a buffalo exceeds 10), they
need not worry about having adjusted in the wrong direction. Indeed, they may infer from their
certainty about the adjustment direction that the correct answer is quite far from the anchor (cf.
Simmons & Nelson, 2006), and they may often believe that they have adjusted insufficiently.
Thus, compared to those who are uncertain about the direction of adjustment, people who are
certain may be more likely to believe that they have adjusted insufficiently, and more likely to
adjust their initial estimates further away from the anchor when motivated to be accurate.
To summarize, we make the following predictions:
1. People will be more likely to believe that they have insufficiently adjusted from anchor
values when they are certain about the direction of adjustment than when they are
uncertain about the direction of adjustment.
2. Increasing accuracy motivation will be more likely to increase anchor-estimate gaps for
people who are certain about the direction of adjustment than for people who are
uncertain about the direction of adjustment (because those who are certain will be more
likely to believe they have adjusted insufficiently).
The Current Research
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Our studies explore these hypotheses, and in so doing, aim to shed new light on motivation’s
influence on anchoring, and specifically on the pivotal finding that motivation tends to increase
adjustment away from self-generated anchors but not from provided anchors (Epley & Gilovich,
2005). We suggest that motivation has previously been shown to have different effects for these
anchor types not because those types induce different psychological processes, but because they
induce differences in certainty about the direction of adjustment. Although people are often
uncertain about the direction in which to adjust from provided anchors (e.g., Jacowitz &
Kahneman, 1995) and thus, according to our framework, may not respond to additional
motivation by adjusting further, people tend to choose self-generated anchors precisely because
such anchors confer certainty about the direction of adjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001):
Participants who estimate George Washington’s election year by starting with an anchor of 1776
likely do so precisely because they know that the true answer must exceed the anchor. Such
participants, according to our framework, may thus be relatively more likely to believe that their
initial adjustments were insufficient and that further adjustment is warranted.
If differences in adjustment-direction certainty explain the distinction between self-generated
and provided anchors, then provided anchors should “behave” like self-generated anchors when
people know in which direction to adjust from such anchors, and self-generated anchors should
“behave” like provided anchors when people do not know in which direction to adjust from such
anchors. Thus, although previous research has shown that accuracy motivation increases anchorestimate gaps for self-generated anchors only (Epley & Gilovich, 2005), we should observe that
accuracy motivation increases anchor-estimate gaps for provided anchors whenever participants
are certain about the direction of adjustment from those anchors. Similarly, although previous
research suggests that accuracy motivation increases anchor-estimate gaps for all self-generated
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anchors, we should observe that this effect fails to obtain whenever participants are uncertain
about the direction of adjustment from those anchors.
In Study 1, we begin by testing our hypothesis that certainty about the direction of
adjustment affects people’s beliefs about whether they initially adjusted insufficiently (vs. too
far) from an anchor. In Studies 2 and 3, we then investigate whether certainty about the direction
of adjustment also determines whether motivation will increase the gap between provided
anchors and final estimates. Although the vast majority of studies investigating the effects of
motivation on adjustment from provided anchors have reported null effects, we predict that
motivation will increase gaps between estimates and provided anchors as long as people are
certain about the correct direction of adjustment.
Studies 4 and 5 more directly examine whether the reported differences in the literature
between self-generated and provided anchors can be explained by differences in adjustmentdirection certainty: Study 4 investigates whether self-generated anchors inspire more
adjustment-direction certainty than provided anchors, and Study 5 investigates whether
motivation’s effect on the gap between self-generated anchors and final estimates depends on
whether people are certain (vs. uncertain) about which way to adjust from such anchors.
Although motivation has previously been found to increase anchor-estimate gaps for selfgenerated anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2005), we predict that motivation will fail to increase gaps
between estimates and self-generated anchors when people are uncertain about the correct
direction of adjustment.
Studies 1a and 1b: Beliefs about the Sufficiency of Adjustment
Studies 1a and 1b investigated our initial proposition that people will be more likely to
believe that they have insufficiently adjusted from an anchor when they are certain about the
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direction of adjustment from that anchor. In both studies, participants answered generalknowledge questions after encountering provided anchors. We manipulated whether or not
people knew the direction of adjustment, and we assessed their beliefs about the sufficiency of
their adjustments. We expected participants who knew the direction of adjustment to be more
likely to believe that their adjustments were insufficient than participants who did not know the
direction of adjustment.
Study 1a Method
Participants. One hundred seventy-nine undergraduates at two private universities
participated for payment.
Procedure. During a laboratory session, participants answered two general-knowledge
questions that provided anchors. The first question asked them to estimate the distance between
Detroit, Michigan and Phoenix, Arizona from an anchor of 1200 miles, and the second question
asked them to estimate the population of Colorado from an anchor of 10 million people.
Before they estimated the correct answer, participants in the direction-known condition were
told, for each question, whether the correct answer was above or below the anchor value.
Participants in the direction-unknown condition were not given this information for either
question. For example, participants in the direction-known condition began by reading the
assertion, “It is true that the distance between Detroit, Michigan and Phoenix, Arizona is less
than 1200 miles,” whereas those in the direction-unknown condition began by answering the
question, “Is the distance between Detroit, Michigan and Phoenix, Arizona greater or less than
1200 miles?” (Note that the direction-unknown condition followed the procedure typically used
in provided-anchor studies).
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For each question, participants (1) estimated the correct answer and subsequently (2)
indicated whether they believed that their estimate, if not exactly correct, was above or below the
true value. For example, after participants estimated the population of Colorado, they were
asked, “Assuming that your previous estimate is not exactly correct, do you think that your
estimate is above or below the exact population of Colorado?” Belief in insufficient adjustment
was presumed when participants (1) adjusted upward from an anchor and indicated that their
estimate was below the true value, or (2) adjusted downward from an anchor and indicated that
their estimate was above the true value. Belief in over-adjustment was presumed when
participants (1) adjusted upward from an anchor and indicated that their estimate was above the
true value, or (2) adjusted downward from an anchor and indicated that their estimate was below
the true value.
Study 1a Results and Discussion
We excluded 4.2% of estimates because they were missing, imprecise (e.g., “900-920
miles”), or equal to the provided anchor value.
Figure 3 shows the results. For the Detroit-Phoenix item, only 27% of participants believed
that their adjustments were insufficient when the direction of adjustment was unknown, but this
proportion was significantly higher when the direction of adjustment was specified (51%), χ2(1,
N = 170) = 10.69, p = .001. We observed a similar result for the Colorado item, where specifying
the direction of adjustment increased the proportion believing they had insufficiently adjusted
from 31% to 48%, χ2(1, N = 173) = 6.32, p = .01.
Thus, the results of this study suggest that when the direction of adjustment is unknown (as
in the standard anchoring paradigm), people may often assume that their initial adjustments from
provided anchors are too extreme rather than insufficient. This finding is important, as it
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challenges the assumption (of traditional anchoring-and-adjustment theory) that increased
accuracy motivation should always cause people to move further away from an anchor.1 Study
1b sought to replicate these results using a different manipulation of adjustment certainty.
Study 1b Method
Participants. One hundred ninety-eight undergraduates at a public university participated for
course credit.
Procedure. As in Study 1a, participants answered two general-knowledge questions that
provided anchors. The first question asked them to estimate the average high temperature in
Miami, Florida in the month of August and the second question asked them to estimate the age of
actor/comedian Jerry Seinfeld. As in Study 1a, for each question, participants (1) estimated the
correct answer and subsequently (2) indicated whether they believed that their estimate, if not
exactly correct, was above or below the true value. In addition, to discourage participants from
assuming that the anchors were informative (Grice, 1975; Schwarz, 1996), they were told that
the anchors were uninformative, and that the “true value may be close to OR far from” the
anchor.
Studies 1a and 1b differed in the manipulation of certainty about the direction of adjustment.
Whereas Study 1a’s manipulation involved simply telling some participants the correct direction
of adjustment, Study 1b manipulated adjustment-direction certainty by manipulating whether
each anchor value was plausible or obviously implausible. For the Miami question, the plausible
anchor was 86 degrees Fahrenheit and the implausible anchor was 10 degrees Fahrenheit. For the
Seinfeld question, the plausible anchor was 47 years and the implausible anchor was 18 years. In
all cases, participants were first asked to indicate whether the true value was higher or lower than
the anchor, and then to estimate the true value. We expected participants to be certain about
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which direction to adjust from implausible anchors (e.g., it is obvious that Miami’s average high
temperature in August exceeds 10 degrees) but not from plausible anchors (e.g., it is less obvious
whether that temperature exceeds 86 degrees). We orthogonally manipulated the plausibility of
each item’s anchor.
Study 1b Results and Discussion
We excluded 2.8% of estimates that were missing or equal to the provided anchor value.
Figure 3 shows the results. For the Miami question, only 41% of participants believed that
their adjustments were insufficient when the anchor was plausible and the direction of
adjustment was therefore uncertain. However, when the anchor was implausible, and the
direction of adjustment was therefore certain, more than half of the participants (60%) believed
that their adjustments were insufficient. The difference between conditions was significant, χ2(1,
N = 194) = 6.68, p = .01. We observed a similar result for the Seinfeld question: The proportion
believing they had insufficiently adjusted was greater when the anchor was implausible (55%)
than when it was plausible (40%), χ2(1, N = 191) = 4.49, p < .04.
The results of Studies 1a and 1b are consistent with each other and with our theorizing. First,
they show that, contrary to prior assumptions, people tend to believe that they have over-adjusted
from provided anchors when, as is typically the case, the direction of adjustment is not obvious.
This supports our suggestion that motivation usually fails to increase gaps between estimates and
provided anchors because people often believe that they have initially adjusted too far from these
anchors. Second, the results show that the belief that one has insufficiently adjusted is more
likely to arise when people are certain about the direction of adjustment. Thus, imparting
participants with certainty about the adjustment direction should, by increasing their tendency to
believe that their initial adjustments are insufficient, create a more favorable context for
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motivation to increase anchor-estimate gaps. (And, of course, motivation should do this if people
are indeed adjusting from provided anchors). Studies 2 and 3 investigated this possibility.
Study 2: Motivation Increases Anchor-Estimate Gaps When the Direction of Adjustment from
Provided Anchors is Known
As reviewed in the introduction, most studies have shown that accuracy motivation fails to
increase adjustment away from provided anchors. Largely because of this, most researchers
have concluded that people do not effortfully adjust from these anchors. However, Study 1
suggested a different reason for the null effects of motivation: Participants may often be unsure
of which direction to adjust from provided anchors, and thus may often believe that their initial
adjustments are too extreme. Thus, they may not consider it wise to adjust further away from
anchors when motivated to be accurate.
In Study 2, we sought to build on Study 1’s findings and to demonstrate that motivation does
increase anchor-estimate gaps as long as participants are certain about the direction of
adjustment. Toward this aim, we asked participants to answer questions that provided anchors.
We manipulated whether participants were motivated to be accurate and whether they were told
the correct direction of adjustment. We expected motivation to increase anchor-estimate gaps
when participants knew in which direction to adjust.
Method
Participants. Two hundred forty-nine undergraduates from a public university participated
for course credit.
Procedure. As part of a laboratory session, participants answered 10 general-knowledge
questions that each provided anchors (Table 1 displays the items). As in Study 1b, we included
an instruction designed to discourage participants from assuming that the anchors were

Do People Adjust From Provided Anchors? 18
informative. Across participants, we manipulated three variables. First, as in Study 1a, we
manipulated whether the correct direction of adjustment from each anchor was known (e.g., “The
length of the Mississippi River is greater than 1200 miles.”) or unknown (e.g., “Is the length of
the Mississippi River greater or less than 1200 miles?”). Second, we manipulated whether
participants were motivated to be accurate. In the motivated condition, participants began by
reading, “In this questionnaire, you have the opportunity to WIN $100!!” They were told that we
would “award $100 to the person who provides the most accurate estimates overall.” These
participants then reported their e-mail addresses so we could contact them if they won. In
contrast, participants in the unmotivated condition were not offered the opportunity to win the
$100 prize and were not asked to provide e-mail addresses. Finally, we manipulated anchor
values by creating two versions of the questionnaire. Anchors that were higher than the correct
answer in one version were lower than the correct answer in the other version, and vice versa.
For example, the Mississippi River item used an anchor of 1200 miles in one version and 3500
miles in the other version (see Table 1). Each version contained a mix of high and low anchors.
Results and Discussion
We excluded 1.8% of responses because they were missing, illegible, or imprecise.
To conduct the critical analysis, we computed each participant’s average anchor-estimate gap
using methods similar to Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004). Specifically, we (1) computed the
absolute value of the difference between each estimate and the anchor, (2) z-scored these values
separately for each question and for each anchor value, and (3) averaged, for each participant, the
z-scored values across all questions. Higher positive numbers indicate a larger gap between
anchors and final estimates.
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A Direction (Known vs. Unknown) x Motivation (Motivated vs. Unmotivated) betweensubjects ANOVA on these anchor-estimate gaps yielded only the predicted Direction x
Motivation interaction, F(1, 245) = 4.04, p < .05. As shown in Figure 4, accuracy motivation
increased anchor-estimate gaps when the direction of adjustment was known, t(123) = 2.19, p =
.03, but not when the direction of adjustment was unknown, t(122) = -0.55, p = .58. Thus,
motivated participants adjusted further away from the provided anchors, but only when they
knew the correct direction of adjustment.
The previous analysis focused on the distance between anchors and final estimates as the
target dependent measure, but because we manipulated anchor values in this study, we could also
analyze the effect of our manipulations on the size of each item’s anchoring effect. In each
Direction x Motivation cell of the design, we computed the anchoring effect for each question
based on the formula used by Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995):
(High anchor mean estimate – Low anchor mean estimate)/(High anchor – Low anchor)
Thus, a mean estimate of 3000 from an anchor of 3500 and a mean estimate of 1500 from an
anchor of 1200 would yield an anchoring effect of (3000-1500)/(3500-1200) = 0.65. Higher
numbers indicate a bigger anchoring effect.
A Direction x Motivation repeated-measures ANOVA on the size of each question’s
anchoring effect yielded a significant main effect of Direction, F(1, 9) = 21.31, p = .001, as well
as a marginally significant interaction, F(1, 9) = 4.70, p < .06. On average, the anchoring effect
was bigger when the direction of adjustment was unknown (M = .51, SE = .06) than when it was
known (M = .32, SE = .07). This effect may have emerged because anchoring effects are
increased by adjustments in the incorrect direction, a tendency that is strongly reduced by telling
participants the correct direction in which to adjust. More important, the interaction supported
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our main hypothesis. Increasing accuracy motivation significantly decreased anchoring when the
direction of adjustment was known, t(9) = 3.92, p = .003, and, as shown in Figure 5, this
tendency was evident for all 10 items. In contrast, accuracy motivation did not decrease
anchoring when the direction of adjustment was unknown, t(9) = -0.26, p = .80.
These results show that accuracy motivation can (1) increase the distance between final
estimates and provided anchors and, in so doing, (2) decrease the size of anchoring effects, as
long as participants know in which direction to adjust from these anchors. Most previous studies
found a null effect of motivation on the effects of provided anchors, but Studies 1 and 2 suggest
that this null effect arose in large part because participants in prior studies were uncertain about
which direction to adjust from the anchors. It may thus have been premature to assert, on the
basis of those null effects, that adjustment plays no role in the effects of provided anchors.
Indeed, the current results suggest that people do effortfully adjust from provided anchors and
that the amount of adjustment can be increased with accuracy motivation. In Study 3, we
attempted to accumulate further support for this notion.
Studies 3a and 3b: Motivation Increases Anchor-Estimate Gaps When Provided Anchors Are
Implausible
In Studies 3a and 3b, we again investigated whether the effect of motivation on anchoring
depends on whether people know in which direction to adjust, but in these studies we
manipulated adjustment-direction certainty differently (and, arguably, more naturally) by altering
the plausibility of the anchors. As in Study 1b, we reasoned that, although participants should be
uncertain about which way to adjust from plausible anchors, they should know in which
direction to adjust from implausible anchors (and, as shown in Study 1b, they should believe that
initial adjustments from implausible anchors are insufficient). Hence, we expected accuracy

Do People Adjust From Provided Anchors? 21
motivation to move estimates further away from implausible anchors but not from plausible
anchors.
Study 3a Method
Participants. One hundred twenty-seven undergraduates at a private university participated
for a chance to win a lottery prize and a $50 gift certificate.
Procedure. In an online survey, we asked participants to answer eight general-knowledge
questions that provided anchors (see Table 2). As in the previous study, we told all participants
that the anchors were uninformative.
The study consisted of two stages. In Stage 1, a computer presented the questions one at a
time, and participants answered each question by making a direction-of-adjustment decision
followed by an estimate, as in the standard anchoring paradigm. For example, participants were
asked, “Did the television show Seinfeld first appear on the air before or after 2005?” and then
they estimated the year it first appeared on the air. We manipulated the plausibility of each
item’s anchor between participants, and half of each participant’s questions featured implausible
anchors (see Table 2). After Stage 1, we introduced Stage 2 (and our motivation manipulation)
by telling participants the following:
Now that you have completed all eight items, we are going to give you a chance to revise
your estimates. For each question, you will be reminded of your answers, and you will be
asked to revise them. You can change all, some, or none of your answers.
If your final answer – after the change – is close enough to the true answer, then you will
receive a point. Points are VERY important, because the more points you earn in this study,
the greater your chances are of winning the grand prize of a $50 amazon.com gift certificate!
. . . Thus, it is important that you give a final answer that is as accurate as possible.
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In Stage 2, participants answered Stage 1’s questions in the same order. For each question,
they were reminded of the original anchor, of their original answer to the direction-of-adjustment
question, and of their original estimate. For example, a participant who estimated that Seinfeld
first aired in 1992 after considering an anchor of 2005 was told:
You indicated that the television show Seinfeld first appeared on the air before 2005. Your
exact estimate of the year that Seinfeld appeared on the air was 1992. You now have a chance
to revise this estimate in order to make it more accurate. If you do not wish to revise your
estimate, please just type the answer that you gave previously. In which year did Seinfeld
first appear on the air?
On each screen in Stage 2, participants were reminded that accurate answers were important for
earning a chance to win the $50 gift certificate.
Thus, all participants answered the questions first without incentives (Stage 1) and then again
with incentives for accuracy (Stage 2). This within-subjects manipulation of incentives allowed
us to precisely measure how participants changed their unmotivated estimates once incentives
were introduced.
Study 3a Results and Discussion
We excluded 1.3% of responses that were missing or extreme (presumably because of typing
errors).
To analyze the effect of motivation on anchor-estimate gaps, we first computed the
difference between participants’ unmotivated Stage 1 estimates and their incentive-motivated
Stage 2 estimates, and then we converted these differences into standard deviation units (by
dividing each difference by the standard deviation of the item’s difference scores). This resulted
in a motivation score that reflected how far newly-motivated participants moved away from (or
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back toward) the anchor. This score was positive if motivation increased the anchor-estimate
gap, negative if motivation decreased the anchor-estimate gap, and zero if the Stage 2 and Stage
1 estimates were identical.
We averaged participants’ motivation scores separately for the four implausible-anchor and
plausible-anchor questions. A paired t-test on these scores revealed the predicted effect, t(126) =
4.61, p < .001: Motivation increased anchor-estimate gaps more for implausible anchors (M =
0.26, SE = .06) than for plausible anchors (M = -0.07, SE = .03; see Figure 6). In fact, motivation
reliably increased anchor-estimate gaps for implausible anchors, t(126) = 4.76, p < .001, but
decreased anchor-estimate gaps for plausible anchors, t(126) = -1.94, p < .055.2 Because people
should know in which direction to adjust from implausible anchors, these results are consistent
with our contention that motivation increases adjustment from provided anchors, but only when
people are certain about the direction of adjustment.
One potential concern with Study 3a is that the within-subjects manipulation of incentives
required participants to explicitly consider whether or not to revise their estimates, which may
have encouraged them to revise their estimates more frequently (or extensively) than they would
have if we had used a between-subjects incentives manipulation. Although this concern cannot
explain the difference observed between anchor types in Study 3a (i.e., why incentives caused
people to adjust further away from implausible anchors but back toward plausible anchors), we
thought it prudent to replicate this result using a between-subjects manipulation of incentives.
Study 3b Method
Participants. Fifty-seven undergraduates at a private university participated for $5.
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Procedure. At the beginning of a short experimental session, we asked participants to answer
six general-knowledge questions that provided anchors (see Table 3).3 As before, we told all
participants that the anchors were uninformative.
This study featured a 2 (Plausibility: Implausible vs. Plausible anchors) x 2 (Motivation:
Motivated vs. Unmotivated) between-subjects design. Participants in the implausible-anchors
condition received implausible anchors for all six items, whereas participants in the plausibleanchors condition received plausible anchors for all six items. Participants in the unmotivated
condition were not promised any reward for answering the general knowledge questions
carefully, whereas participants in the motivated condition were promised an additional $1 for
each answer they generated that was close to the right answer. Participants in the motivated
condition were paid immediately after completing the task.
Study 3b Results and Discussion
We excluded 2.4% of responses because they were missing.
Our theory predicts that accuracy motivation will be more likely to increase adjustment
further away from implausible anchors than from plausible anchors. To test this, we first
computed each participant’s average anchor-estimate gap, as in Study 2. This computation
yielded a z-score, with higher numbers indicating a larger distance between anchors and final
estimates.
We then conducted a Plausibility (Implausible vs. Plausible) x Motivation (Motivated vs.
Unmotivated) between-subjects ANOVA on these anchor-estimate gaps. This analysis yielded
only the predicted Plausibility x Motivation interaction, F(1, 53) = 6.03, p < .02. As shown in
Figure 7, and consistent with the results of Study 3a, accuracy motivation increased anchorestimate gaps when the anchors were implausible, t(26) = 1.84, p < .04 (one-tailed), but tended to
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decrease anchor-estimate gaps when the anchors were plausible, t(27) = -1.62, p < .06 (onetailed).4 Once again this constitutes evidence that accuracy motivation does increase adjustment
away from provided anchors, as long as participants are certain about the direction in which to
adjust. Although prior findings suggested that motivation had no effects for provided anchors,
our results suggest that those null effects may have arisen because participants were uncertain
about which direction to adjust from those anchors, and not because participants were not
adjusting at all.
Study 4: Greater Certainty in the Direction of Adjustment from Self-Generated Anchors Than
From Provided Anchors
Studies 1 through 3 showed that accuracy motivation can increase adjustment away from
provided anchors as long as participants are certain about the direction in which to adjust from
those anchors. Recall that researchers have typically found that motivation increases adjustment
away from self-generated anchors but not from provided anchors (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2005).
We argue that differences in adjustment-direction certainty may explain this pattern of results,
and that one key difference between self-generated and provided anchors is that people are
generally more certain about the direction of adjustment from the former than the latter. We thus
argue that this difference in adjustment-direction certainty (rather than some fundamental
difference between the anchors or the types of processing that they engender) accounts for the
previously observed differential impact of motivation. Study 4 investigates whether people are,
in fact, typically more certain about the direction of adjustment when anchors are self-generated
than when they are provided.
Method
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Participants. One hundred five members of an academic research website participated for a
chance to win a $40 gift certificate.
Procedure. In an online survey, participants rated how confident they were in the direction of
adjustment from provided and self-generated anchors. For each of the provided-anchor
questions, participants identified the direction of adjustment from the provided anchor (e.g., “Is
the average length of a whale greater or less than 69 feet?”), and then they were asked, “How
confident are you in your answer?” For each of the self-generated-anchor questions, participants
were first asked a question designed to assess whether they knew the correct anchor (e.g., “In
which year did the United States declare its independence?”). They were then asked to judge the
direction of adjustment (e.g., “Was George Washington elected president before or after the
United States declared its independence?”) and to rate their confidence in their answer.
Participants rated their confidence on a 7-point scale, with endpoints of 1 = “not at all confident”
and 7 = “absolutely certain.”
The 11 provided-anchor questions and 9 self-generated-anchor questions were presented in
separate blocks, with block order counterbalanced across participants. We selected all of the
questions and anchors from Epley and Gilovich’s (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006) research comparing
self-generated and provided anchors (see Table 4).
Results
Because all past studies of the difference between self-generated and provided anchors
eliminated responses of participants who failed to correctly generate the self-generated anchor
(Epley and Gilovich 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006), we did the same. In total, 19.56% of selfgenerated responses were excluded.5 To examine whether participants were more certain in the
direction of adjustment from self-generated than from provided anchors, we first averaged
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participants’ certainty ratings separately for the provided-anchor and self-generated-anchor
items. As predicted, participants were significantly more certain about the direction of
adjustment from self-generated anchors (M = 5.60, SE = .11) than from provided anchors (M =
4.56, SE = .12), t(104) = 9.73, p < .001. Across-item analyses on the means displayed in Table 4
similarly show that, on average, the self-generated-anchor items used by previous researchers
induced more adjustment-direction certainty than did the provided-anchor items used by those
researchers, t(18) = 3.03, p = .007.6 Thus, the prior studies that found that motivation is more
likely to increase adjustment away from self-generated than provided anchors may have found
this because those self-generated anchors confer greater certainty in the direction of adjustment.
Study 5: Motivation Increases Adjustment Away From Self-Generated Anchors Only When the
Direction of Adjustment Is Certain
As noted, the typical finding in the prior literature is that motivation increases adjustment
away from self-generated, but not provided, anchors. However, one critical difference between
self-generated and provided anchors is that the former typically induce more certainty about the
direction of adjustment than do the latter (Study 4). If differences in adjustment-direction
certainty explain why self-generated and provided anchors are affected differently by motivation,
then motivation should no longer increase adjustment from self-generated anchors if people can
be made uncertain (instead of certain) about the direction of adjustment from those anchors.
Thus, in Study 5, we manipulated whether a self-generated anchor induced certainty or
uncertainty about the direction of adjustment. Following the above reasoning, we predicted that
accuracy motivation would increase anchor-estimate gaps only for self-generated anchors that
induce certainty in the direction of adjustment.
Method
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Participants. Three hundred thirty-one members of an academic research website
participated for a chance to win a $30 gift certificate.
Procedure. This procedure resembled that of Study 3a. Participants began the online survey
by answering a self-generated anchoring question without incentives for accuracy. Those in the
certain condition were asked to estimate the highest recorded body temperature in a human
being. Those in the uncertain condition were asked to estimate the average body temperature of a
bobcat. Unlike in Studies 2 and 3, no anchors were provided to participants; instead, we expected
participants in both conditions to generate and use the average body temperature of a human as
an anchor when answering these questions. Although participants should know in which
direction to adjust from that anchor in the certain condition (“the highest human body
temperature is certainly higher than the average human body temperature”), they should be much
less sure of the appropriate direction in the uncertain condition (“are bobcats warmer or cooler
than the average human?”).
After answering this question, participants moved on to a new screen that informed them that
they could revise their prior estimates and that an accurate estimate would earn them entry into a
drawing for a $100 amazon.com gift card. They were then given a chance to revise their
estimates. For example, a participant who originally estimated the highest recorded human body
temperature to be 105 degrees Fahrenheit read:
You indicated that the highest recorded body temperature in a human being was 105 degrees
Fahrenheit. You now have a chance to revise this estimate in order to make it more accurate.
If you accurately answer this question, you will earn a chance to win a $100 amazon gift
card! If you do not wish to revise your estimate, please just type the answer that you gave
previously. What is the highest recorded body temperature in a human being?
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After generating their revised estimates, participants were asked to indicate the average body
temperature of a healthy human being (to assess whether they knew the anchor), and they were
asked whether they had thought of this number when generating the earlier estimate (Epley &
Gilovich, 2005). They then indicated the direction of adjustment from the self-generated anchor
(e.g., “Is the average temperature of a healthy human being greater or less than the average body
temperature of a bobcat?”), and they rated how certain they were in their answer to that question
(1 = completely uncertain; 9 = completely certain). Finally, we asked participants to indicate
whether they looked up the answer while completing the survey. We assured them that their
earnings would be unaffected by how they answered this final question.
Results
We eliminated 6.0% of participants because they indicated looking up the answer while
completing the survey. Following Epley and Gilovich (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006), we also
excluded 11.1% of participants for failing to generate the correct anchor (i.e., people who
thought that the average human body temperature was something other than 98-99 degrees
Fahrenheit), and another 11.5% of participants for indicating that they did not use the anchor.
None of these percentages differed by condition, meaning, for example, that participants who
estimated the bobcat’s average body temperature were just as likely as those who estimated the
highest recorded human body temperature to correctly generate and report using the average
human body temperature as an anchor. We were left with 225 participants for the final analysis,
110 in the certain condition and 115 in the uncertain condition.
We successfully manipulated whether participants were certain about the direction of
adjustment: Participants in the certain condition were more certain about the direction of
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adjustment (M = 8.35, SE = .17) than were participants in the uncertain condition (M = 3.90, SE
= .21), t(223) = 16.17, p < .001.
To analyze the effect of motivation on anchor-estimate gaps, we first computed the
difference between participants’ unmotivated initial estimates and their incentive-motivated
revised estimates, and then we converted these differences into standard deviation units (by
dividing each difference by the standard deviation of the item’s difference scores). This resulted
in a motivation score that reflected how far newly-motivated participants moved away from (or
back toward) the anchor. As in Study 3a, this score was positive if motivation increased the
anchor-estimate gap, negative if motivation decreased the anchor-estimate gap, and zero if the
two estimates were identical.
A t-test on these motivation scores revealed the predicted effect, t(223) = 3.42, p < .001:
Motivation increased anchor-estimate gaps more in the certain (M = 0.24, SE = .10) than in the
uncertain condition (M = -0.21, SE = .09). Replicating Epley and Gilovich (2005), motivation
increased the anchor-estimate gap when people estimated the highest recorded temperature in a
human being (and were thus certain about the direction of adjustment from the self-generated
anchor), t(109) = 2.52, p < .02. However, when people estimated the average temperature of a
bobcat (and were thus uncertain about the direction of adjustment from that same self-generated
anchor), motivation significantly decreased the anchor-estimate gap, t(114) = -2.31, p < .03.7
Thus, whereas Studies 1 through 3 showed that provided anchors can “behave” like selfgenerated anchors when participants are certain about the direction of adjustment, Study 5 shows
that self-generated anchors can “behave” like provided anchors when participants are uncertain
about the direction of adjustment. These findings suggest that certainty about the direction of
adjustment is an important difference between self-generated and provided anchors, a difference
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that can perhaps explain why self-generated anchors are typically affected by increasing
motivation, but why provided anchors typically are not. Indeed, our results suggest that
adjustment is an important process underlying responding to both types of anchors, and that the
anchors may not, as previously assumed, give rise to fundamentally different types of processing.
General Discussion
In this paper, we have revealed how accuracy motivation affects anchoring and adjustment.
More specifically, we have shown that people are generally more certain about the direction of
adjustment from self-generated than from provided anchors (Study 4), and that, when people are
certain (vs. uncertain) about the direction of adjustment from an anchor, they are more likely to
conclude that they have insufficiently adjusted from that anchor (Study 1). Most important, we
have shown that certainty about the direction of adjustment – and not anchor type – determines
whether accuracy motivation will increase adjustments from an anchor: Motivated participants
adjust further away from anchors as long as they are certain about the direction of adjustment,
regardless of whether the anchor is provided or self-generated (Studies 2, 3, and 5). These
results have important theoretical implications. In what follows, we discuss what these findings
suggest about current theories of anchoring.
Anchoring and Adjustment Theory
According to anchoring-and-adjustment theory, people effortfully adjust away from anchor
values, and motivation increases the tendency to adjust more than usual – that is, to carefully
revise estimates. According to existing versions of this theory, adjustment involves moving
further from anchor values; hence, motivation should increase the gap between anchors and final
estimates and decrease anchoring effects. However, this prediction has not often been supported,
as accuracy motivation has rarely been shown to reduce anchoring effects (Chapman & Johnson,
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2002). This discrepancy between the theory’s predictions and empirical findings caused many
researchers to abandon anchoring and adjustment as an explanation of how provided anchors
affect judgment. Indeed, many researchers believe that people do not adjust from provided
anchors (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).
In contrast, we have proposed that people do adjust from all anchor values, but that one must
reconsider how motivation affects adjustment. We suggested that the process of adjustment can
proceed in multiple directions. For example, after initially adjusting upward from a low anchor
value, a respondent can conclude that her initial adjustment was too extreme, and thereby adjust
her estimate by retreating back toward the anchor. If one accepts this (admittedly simple) notion,
then motivation should increase the gap between anchors and final estimates only when
participants believe they have insufficiently adjusted from the anchor values in the first place. If
this revised view of adjustment is accurate, then the effect of accuracy motivation on the size of
the anchor-estimate gap should depend heavily on people’s beliefs about the sufficiency of their
initial adjustments.
To investigate this notion, we identified one factor that influences these beliefs: certainty
about the direction of adjustment. We predicted that being uncertain (vs. certain) about the
direction of adjustment will more often spur the belief that one has adjusted too far or perhaps in
the wrong direction. Consistent with this prediction, Studies 1a and 1b showed that people who
knew the correct direction of adjustment were more likely to believe they insufficiently adjusted
from anchor values than people for whom the correct direction of adjustment was much less
obvious. Further, consistent with Studies 1a and 1b and with our revised view of anchoring and
adjustment, Studies 2, 3, and 5 showed that accuracy motivation moved estimates further from
anchors, but that it did so only when people were certain about the direction of adjustment. When
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people were uncertain about the direction of adjustment, accuracy motivation either exerted no
consistent effect (Study 2), or brought estimates significantly nearer to anchors (Studies 3 and
5). Thus, prior studies that found no effect of motivation on provided anchors (and that therefore
concluded that adjustment does not operate for provided anchors) may have been hindered by
participants’ uncertainty about the direction in which to adjust from the anchors.8 We show that
motivation can, under specific theoretically-derived conditions, produce measurable effects on
responses to provided anchors. In so doing, we provide strong support for the notion that people
do effortfully adjust from provided anchor values.
Self-Generated vs. Provided Anchors
Previous research has emphasized a distinction between self-generated anchors and those that
are externally provided (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006). Anchoring-and-adjustment
theory is believed to explain how self-generated anchors affect judgment, whereas the selective
accessibility model is believed to explain the effects of provided anchors. As noted, this
distinction was based largely on the fact that motivation did little to moderate the effects of
provided anchors, but had reliable effects when anchors were self-generated. Our findings
suggest, however, that such disparate effects of motivation arose not because self-generated and
provided anchors induce fundamentally different judgmental processes, but rather because
people are typically uncertain about which way to adjust from provided anchors but certain about
which way to adjust from self-generated anchors (Study 4). Indeed, no matter whether the
anchors were provided or self-generated, motivation increased anchor-estimate gaps when
participants were certain about in which direction to adjust (Studies 2, 3a, 3b, and 5). On the
basis of these findings, we believe that the distinction between self-generated and provided
anchors is unnecessary for understanding the types of processing underlying anchoring effects.
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(Of course, the distinction between these anchor types remains interesting for other reasons, such
as for understanding when anchoring might arise). A more parsimonious theory is likely
appropriate – a theory that assumes that all anchor types induce the same psychological
processes, processes that we believe are captured both by anchoring-and-adjustment and
selective accessibility.
We should note that the distinction between self-generated and externally-provided anchors
has been supported by studies investigating variables other than accuracy motivation. Indeed,
research has more generally shown that variables that increase thinking (e.g., horizontal head
movement, need for cognition) increase adjustment away from self-generated anchors but not
from provided anchors, whereas variables that decrease thinking (e.g., vertical head movement,
alcohol use) decrease adjustment away from self-generated anchors but not from provided
anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2004, 2006). These findings are completely consistent with
our framework: Although this paper focused on the effects of accuracy motivation on anchoring
and adjustment, we, like all anchoring-and adjustment theorists, predict that any variable that
increases thinking will increase people’s tendency to revise their initial estimates. Moreover, we
predict that such variables will prompt people to revise their estimates further from the anchor
only when they are certain about the direction of adjustment (or when they believe, for any other
reason, that their initial adjustments are insufficient). Because it is very likely that only selfgenerated anchors conferred participants with certainty about the direction of adjustment in prior
studies (see Study 4), our theory is consistent with the fact that variables that increased thinking
(e.g., horizontal head movement) increased adjustment away from self-generated anchors only.
However, we also predict that similar effects will emerge for provided anchors whenever people
are certain about which direction to adjust from such anchors. In sum, we believe that our theory
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can explain all of these prior discrepancies between provided and self-generated anchors, while
doing so parsimoniously, without assuming that different anchors induce different processes.9
Selective Accessibility Model
The selective accessibility model (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999, 2000; Strack & Mussweiler,
1997) is widely considered to be the best explanation of how provided anchors affect judgment.
Indeed, there is much evidence supporting the model’s signature claim, which is that the act of
considering anchor values increases the accessibility of anchor-consistent information, which in
turn changes which values people believe to be plausible (see Epley 2004, for a review). We do
not dispute any of this evidence. We feel, however, that our data strongly suggest that the
processes outlined by the selective accessibility model are not the only processes that underlie
the effects of provided anchors. After all, ex ante, the selective accessibility model does not
predict that motivation will affect the size of anchor-estimate gaps (see Chapman & Johnson,
2002). In fact, proponents of the selective accessibility model have often cited the null effect of
motivation on anchoring as a finding that is consistent with their theory and have never
suggested that motivation should affect anchor-estimate gaps (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002;
Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999).
Ultimately, the selective accessibility model is silent about which variables affect the size of
anchor-estimate gaps and about the process by which initial estimates are revised. Because of
this, the selective accessibility model cannot predict the results reported in this paper, but neither
is it undermined by these results.
Toward an Integrative Theory of Anchoring
As stated in the introduction, whereas many theorists assume that the selective accessibility
model and anchoring-and-adjustment theory constitute competing explanations of anchoring,
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they are not logically contradictory, and we think it is more appropriate to consider them as
complementary accounts that both contribute to anchoring effects. Indeed, on the one hand, the
selective accessibility model (but not anchoring-and-adjustment theory) can nicely account for a
finding that is often replicated – namely, merely considering an anchor increases the perceived
plausibility of values that are close to the anchor.10 On the other hand, our revision of anchoringand-adjustment theory (but not the selective accessibility model) can nicely account for the fact
that motivation can, under predictable conditions, increase anchor-estimate gaps and decrease
anchoring effects (as shown here). Neither theory can explain both of these empirical regularities
(but neither of them is threatened by them, either). Thus, we believe that both theories are useful
and necessary, and that they must co-exist to provide a more complete account of anchoring
effects (see Figure 2b).
We further suggest that selective accessibility and effortful adjustment processes operate
independently when anchors are encountered. Merely considering an anchor may lead people to
selectively recruit anchor-consistent information, and reliance on that information may increase
the perceived plausibility of estimates close to the anchor. At the same time, people settle on
final estimates by effortfully adjusting away from (and possibly back toward) anchors.11 This
integrative theory is more parsimonious than existing theories because it does not assume that
different anchors (self-generated vs. experimenter-provided; plausible vs. implausible) exert
fundamentally different effects on judgment. Moreover, it is the only theory that can
parsimoniously account for existing evidence and the evidence presented in this article.
This integrative theory suggests a refreshingly clear and new agenda for future anchoring
research. Rather than debating which of anchoring’s many theories are correct, researchers
should look for ways to integrate and refine them. For example, questions about whether
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adjustment happens should give way to questions about how adjustment operates (e.g.,
Janiszewski & Uy, 2008). We look forward to future research that proceeds in this spirit.
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Footnotes
1. The results of Study 1a are not entirely in line with our predictions. Because fewer than half
of those who knew the direction of adjustment believed they had adjusted insufficiently,
these data cannot explain why increasing accuracy motivation typically increases adjustment
away from self-generated anchors, for which the direction of adjustment is typically known
(Epley & Gilovich, 2005). One possible explanation is that because participants in Study 1a
were not told that the anchors were uninformative, some believed that the correct answers
were very close to the anchors, and thus that they had over-adjusted. We remedied this in
Study 1b by telling participants that the anchors were uninformative. Collapsing across both
items in Study 1b, participants who were certain about the direction of adjustment were more
likely to believe that they had adjusted insufficiently than that they had overadjusted, χ2(1, N
= 195) = 4.31, p < .03.
2. For 6 of the 8 questions, Stage 1 estimates from implausible anchors were significantly
further from accuracy than estimates from plausible anchors (i.e., there was a bigger
anchoring effect for the implausible anchors; see Strack and Mussweiler, 1997, for the same
effect). However, this effect did not account for the differential effect of motivation on
anchor-estimate gaps for plausible versus implausible anchors. By-item analyses on adjusted
means that co-varied out Stage 1 estimates yielded the same results reported earlier:
Incentives increased anchor-estimate gaps more for implausible than plausible anchors, t(7) =
5.73, p = .001. This rules out the possibility that incentives increased anchor-estimate gaps
for implausible anchors mainly because those anchors were more likely to elicit initially
insufficient adjustments.
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3. The first 18 participants received a questionnaire that contained an error on the sixth and
final question (about New York City’s temperature), and the error rendered any responses to
this question meaningless. Thus, we analyzed these participants’ responses to only the first
five questions.
4. These results were consistent across items. Accuracy motivation directionally increased
anchor-estimate gaps for five out of six items when the anchors were implausible, but
directionally decreased anchor-estimate gaps for five out of six items when the anchors were
plausible. Moreover, despite the use of a small number of items in this study, a by-item
Plausibility x Motivation repeated-measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction, F(1,
5) = 7.99, p < .04.
5. This exclusion rate is very similar to other self-generated anchoring studies. For example,
Epley and Gilovich (2001, Study 2) excluded 20.67% of their participants using the same
criteria.
6. Table 4 reveals one oddity. Although, logically, it must be true that the second explorer after
Columbus landed in the West Indies after Columbus did, participants were not very confident
about this. We speculate that this lack of confidence arose because the question’s surprising
obviousness (“Did the second European explorer, after Columbus, land in the West Indies
before or after Columbus first landed in the West Indies?”) led some participants to interpret
this question differently than we intended or to worry that this was a “trick question.” A
clearer wording may have yielded more certainty about the direction of adjustment.
7. Additional analyses showed that certainty in the direction of the adjustment correlated
positively with participants’ motivation scores, r(223) = .15, p < .03.
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8. Although prior studies have typically found a null effect of motivation on provided anchors,
strictly speaking, our theory predicts that motivation will decrease anchor-estimate gaps
when participants are uncertain about the direction of adjustment. However, if participants
are differentially certain about the direction of adjustment (i.e., if some are certain and some
are uncertain) or if the items in a study differentially generate certainty about the direction of
adjustment (i.e., if some generate certainty and some generate uncertainty), then motivation
may exert no consistent effect on adjustment, resulting in the observed null effects. It is also
worth noting that null effects of motivation may arise because of measurement error; indeed,
many anchoring questions generate highly variable answers, and this variance strongly
decreases the probability of detecting an effect of motivation on adjustment.
9. Epley and Gilovich (2006) have recently found that people’s estimates reside in the anchor
half of the plausible range of target values for self-generated anchors but not for provided
anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). This is the newest finding in the self-generated vs.
provided anchor literature, and it is believed to constitute evidence for the operation of
effortful adjustment: That is, for any estimate, people believe that a range of values is
plausible. According to Epley and Gilovich, anchoring-and-adjustment theory predicts that, if
people are truly adjusting from an anchor, they will terminate their adjustments somewhere
in the half of the plausible range that is closest to the anchor value. Epley and Gilovich
(2006) report that estimates reside in the anchor half of the plausible range of values only
when anchors are self-generated, but we have recently conducted a study that shows that
estimates from provided anchors can also reside in the anchor half of the plausible range,
especially when participants are certain about the direction of adjustment. This again
suggests that differences in adjustment-direction certainty may underlie the observed
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differences between self-generated and provided anchors. Please contact the first author for a
complete summary of this study.
10. Revisions to the selective accessibility model have been proposed in order to explain the oftreplicated finding that anchoring effects tend to be larger when anchors are extreme than
when they are moderate (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). However, if, as our reading of the
selective accessibility model suggests, the mere act of considering an anchor increases the
plausibility of values that are close to the anchor, then considering an extreme (moderate)
anchor will make extreme (moderate) values seem more plausible, thereby making extreme
(moderate) estimates more likely. And, of course, more extreme estimates translate into
bigger anchoring effects.
11. Although we think it is safest to assume that selective accessibility and effortful adjustment
processes operate independently, it is interesting to consider ways in which they might
interact. One speculation is that the consideration of accessible anchor-consistent information
may increase the perceived plausibility of values that are close to the anchor, which may,
when the direction of adjustment is not specified, increase uncertainty in the direction of
adjustment. This may, in turn, decrease the propensity to believe that one’s initial adjustment
is insufficient, and therefore decrease the tendency for accuracy motivation to elicit
adjustments that are even further away from the anchor. Thus, it is possible that selective
accessibility processes influence adjustment processes by increasing adjustment-direction
uncertainty.
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Table 1
Study 2: Questions and Anchors
Question
Length of Mississippi River (miles)
Average annual rainfall in Philadelphia (inches)
Year James K. Polk began his term as U.S. President
Maximum speed of a house cat (miles per hour)
Average annual temperature in Phoenix (degrees Fahrenheit)
Population of Chicago
Height of Mount Everest (feet)
Average lifespan of a bullfrog (years)
Number of countries in the world
Distance between San Francisco and Kansas City (miles)

Low Anchor
1,200
25
1815
5
52
800,000
13,000
2
55
600

High Anchor
3,500
65
1875
55
94
5,000,000
45,000
30
330
3,000

Correct Answer
2,320
41
1845
30
73
2,900,000
29,032
16
192
1800
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Table 2
Study 3a: Questions and Anchors
Question
Year Seinfeld first aired
Average temperature in Montreal in December
Jack Nicholson’s birth year
Average temperature in Phoenix in August
Year The Godfather appeared in theaters
Average temperature in Los Angeles in July
Jennifer Lopez’s birth year
Average temperature in Boston in January

Plausible Anchor
1995
39°F
1945
90°F
1978
76°F
1975
42°F

Implausible Anchor
2005
85°F
1977
50°F
1991
43°F
1988
86°F

Correct Answer
1989
26°F
1937
105°F
1972
84°F
1970
36°F
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Table 3
Study 3b: Questions and Anchors
Question
Year Seinfeld first aired
Average temperature in Boston in January
Year JFK began his term as U.S. President
Average temperature in Phoenix in August
Year Back To The Future appeared in theaters
Average temperature in New York in September

Plausible Anchor
1993
39°F
1965
96°F
1982
70°F

Implausible Anchor
2007
90°F
1995
20°F
1940
18°F

Correct Answer
1989
36°F
1961
105°F
1985
74°F
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Table 4
Study 4: Questions, Anchors, and Results
Item

Anchor

Adjustment-Direction
Certainty

Self-Generated
Year of 2nd explorer after Columbus
George Washington’s election year
Boiling point of water on Mt. Everest
Days for Mars to orbit sun
Gestation period of an elephant
Freezing point of vodka
Lowest recorded human temp.
Highest recorded human temp.
Number of U.S. states in 1840
Average

1492
1776
212˚F
365
9 months
32˚F
98.6˚F
98.6˚F
50

4.45
5.20
5.24
5.34
5.49
5.71
6.32
6.43
6.48
5.6

130
127
2,000 miles
69 feet
7 mph
45,500 feet
1˚F
1920
65 feet
100
200,000

3.29
3.77
3.88
4.12
4.19
4.54
4.61
4.74
5.02
5.89
6.11
4.6

Provided
Number of female profs at Berkeley
Number of nations in UN
Length of Mississippi River
Average length of a whale
Maximum speed of a housecat
Height of Mt. Everest
Average winter temp. in Antarctica
Year telephone invented
Height of tallest redwood
Number of U.S. babies born per day
Population of Chicago
Average

Note. Adjustment-direction certainty was rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all
confident and 7 = absolutely certain).
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Figure Captions
1. Anchoring-and-Adjustment Theory: Current and Revised
2. The Theoretical Relationship Between Selective Accessibility and Anchoring and
Adjustment: Current and Revised
3. Studies 1a and 1b: Percentage of Participants Believing Their Initial Adjustments Were
Insufficient
4. Study 2: The Effect of Motivation on Anchor-Estimate Gaps
5. Study 2: The Effect of Motivation on Anchoring
6. Study 3a: The Effect of Motivation on Anchor-Estimate Gaps
7. Study 3b: The Effect of Motivation on Anchor-Estimate Gaps
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Note. Figure 1b is not meant to imply that adjustment-direction certainty is the only determinant of beliefs
about the sufficiency of adjustment. There are likely many such determinants.
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